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Hence the theater-goers became noisy 
instead of silent, as though they knew the 
difference between good and bad music, 
and in place of an aristocracy in music 
there sprang up a kind of base theatrocracy 
Plato, Laws 
 
The early modern stage did more than 
reflect relations occurring elsewhere: it 
modeled and in important respects 
materialized those relations 
J-C Agnew, Worlds Apart 
 
Theatre governed Rome 
Cicero 
 
 
 
Plato’s life-long struggle for diagnosing the Sophist: A Prologue 
 
Plato’s entire work, following the ‘mission’ of Socrates, was set in motion by a passionate 
effort of trying to understand what is going on in his beloved Athens; why it happens 
that the city, at the height of its greatest glory, is being – or rather had already been – 
subsumed into a repulsive kind of decadence and decay. 
 Still following the spirit and guiding example of Socrates, he attributed the 
greatest role in this to the corrupting influence of the Sophists, and his first series of 
Dialogues, centring around the figure of Socrates, attempt to give a precise illustration 
and diagnosis of this nefarious activity. Given that the Sophists were teachers and 
rhetoricians, this undertaking understandably focused on the power of words. It was 
rendered particularly difficult by a major paradox: the diagnosis of the Sophists required 
the use of words, thus the possibility was eminent that such a diagnosis would use the 
power of words in a manner not so dissimilar from the Sophists. Even further, as words 
are artefacts, they do not have a real, material substance on their own, not possessing 
concrete, personal characteristics, and thus the same words can be deployed, cunningly, 
cynically or sophistically, for a variety of different and often opposed meanings. The core 
of Plato’s philosophy touches upon human virtue, the good life, the beauty of the world, 
but all these terms can be used to question, denigrate or ridicule the very same ideas. 
However, and even further, after a time Plato came to realise that the central 
concern of the Sophists, which was the radical revaluation of life by promoting non-
being, thus placing at the centre of attention their non-personality and even procuring in 
this way a certain ‘good life’ – not the Platonic one, but the life of fame, fortune and fun 
– is even more effectively served by images than by words: by a strategic deployment of 
‘invented images’, products of pure fancy, imagination and fantasy. This is the reason 
why his planned, conclusive assessment of the Sophists, the dialogue bearing that title, 
has as its centre the power of the image to insinuate itself in reality and thus alter it. 
Yet, evidently, and just around the time that he finished this assessment that he 
intended to be in a way conclusive – after all, decades passed between the early Socratic 
dialogues and the Sophist – his analysis/diagnosis moved to a third level. We get a glimpse 
of this in what I consider traces of a genuine ‘vision-experience’ Plato had while working 
on the next dialogue, the Statesmen: the core of the lethal activities of the Sophists reside 
	   3	  
in the particular combination of words and images that is represented by theatre (see 
291a-b and 303c-d). This experience, however, evidently came after Plato already 
finished the Sophist; at least, it is only in this way that one can explain that it is not part 
of Plato’s characterisation of the Sophist in the Sophist. 
 Yet, the issue of theatricality was touched upon by Plato before. From the 
perspective of the diagnosis of ‘theatrocracy’ in the Laws one gains the impression that 
such a connection between the Sophists and the theatre was somehow lurking behind in 
the work of Plato in several and central places. It was certainly there in the Ion, and even 
the Symposium has strong theatrical aspects  - we should recall that it even ends on the 
note of Socrates discussing the identity of writing tragedies and comedies – though, 
being so drunk, nobody could remember what exactly he was saying. These two 
dialogues are notoriously difficult to date, considered to have a transitional character, 
which might indicate that Plato was not yet ready to formulate his diagnosis of 
theatricality. 
 
Theatrocracy in the Laws  in context 
 
The central aim of the Laws, this last Dialogue of Plato, intended to be conclusive, is the 
proper foundation of a city. It is not possible here to go into any details about the 
meaning of such an undertaking, except for indicating that Plato was aware of the 
paradox that a perfectly functioning city can actually be counterproductive in the sense 
that people then would be deprived of the experience of suffering that is necessary to 
gain wisdom, and thus could eventually easily subsume to the forces of corruption 
(Republic 609c). For our purposes the important question is the analysis of the sources 
that could derail the functioning of a polity; and here the Sophists are again at the centre 
of Plato’s concern, as it is shown with particular clarity in the comprehensive analysis, 
evidently delayed so far, of the central teaching of Protagoras – who was the eponymous 
hero of Plato’s first Socratic dialogue – concerning the Sophist attitude with respect to 
the divine, and its untenability (Laws 886b-7c). 
 Plato starts by stating the problem: discussion of the right constitution is 
necessary, as the city has lost its way, following now the advice of the ‘pleasure principle’, 
being captivated not simply by doing whatever brings immediate pleasure and avoids 
pain, but also ‘opinions about the future, which go by the general name of 
“expectations” (644b-c). It is in, and against, such a context, and the popular forces 
ruling in it, that a philosopher must follow the proper attitude, which ‘require a bold man 
who, valuing candour above all else, will declare what he deems best for the city and 
citizens […] in the midst of corrupted souls’ (835c).1 
 This leads us to the diagnosis offered by Plato about such confusion. He 
proceeds is three steps. In the first, he identifies its basic, anthropological sources in the 
imitative arts (668c). Imitation is a fundamental aspect of human life, and the condition of 
possibility of learning and education. It is exactly this characteristic that the imitative arts 
use to the full, reproducing and enacting certain aspects of life and forms of behaviour, 
trying to make them ‘pleasing’. The problem concerns the manner in which one can 
judge and recognise the rightfulness of such imitations (668d-9a). 
 The third discussion of the theme returns to the problem, with particular clarity, 
and also offers a crucial personal insight. It starts by restating that there indeed are 
dangerous works which should not be produced, read, shown or played; but that it is 
quite difficult to discuss such matters, as ‘it is no easy matter to gainsay tens of thousands 
of tongues’ (810d). The problem, however, cannot be reduced to external opposition and 
the courage required facing it, as there is a thornier matter – and here we get a rare 
glimpse of personal tone. Plato admits his own perplexity, as he himself is quite fond of 
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mimetic art (811d-e). It is well worth recalling here a somewhat earlier passage, which 
discussed, in a kind astonishing and ‘non-Platonic’ way, the relationship between the 
playful and the serious. Plato formulates here one of his most important and also 
perplexing claims about humans being not merely the playthings of the divine, as if 
puppets on a string (about this, see 644d-5b), rather that the most important aspects of 
human life are rooted in playfulness; and play of course is not only closely related to art, 
both being highly mimetic, but also to education and culture, which in Greek are even 
etymologically connected (paideia).  Here Plato restates that genuine priorities are exactly 
the opposite as people think today; and that, in particular, wars are not serious matters, 
meriting the attention of a philosopher. Plato performs such a genuinely and 
etymologically radical revaluation of values, returning to the original, uncorrupted state 
of human affairs, that it is well worth quoting in full: people now ‘imagine that serious 
work should be done for the sake of play; for they think that it is for the sake of peace 
that the serious work of war needs to be well conducted. But as a matter of fact we, it 
would seem, do not find in war, either as existing or likely to exist, either real play or 
education worthy of the name, which is what we assert to be in our eyes the most serious 
thing’ (803d). 
 However, we now must return to the second major discussion, as it is the most 
important and specific of the three, and as it is there that Plato presents the diagnosis of 
a ‘theatrocracy’. 
 
The concrete context in which the diagnosis is offered is a central element of the 
preparatory discussion: in order to find the right constitution, one must have a good 
knowledge of the existing ones. As this right constitution must have a balance between 
two opposite, equally disastrous positions, excessive centralisation and decentralisation of 
rule, monarchy and democracy, the question is to strike the right, harmonious balance. It 
is exactly in this sense that the term ‘laws’ (nomos) is understood by Plato, and so this is 
the reason why music plays such a central role in the argument, as metaphor of the right 
constitution. And it is exactly through music that one can capture the heart of what has 
gone wrong in Athens. Here it is necessary to quote Plato in great detail. 
 Music implies harmony, and harmony implies the rightful coexistence of different 
sounds and kinds of music; thus, ‘it was forbidden to set one kind of words to a different 
class of tune’ (in Greek called nomes, root of the term used for ‘law’, nomos) (700b-c). 
Those who were producing music, or listening to it, had to recognize and follow such 
rules, and not ‘the mob’s unmusical shoutings, nor yet the clappings which mark 
applause’ (700c). Such rules were accepted as legitimate without any dissent; yet, ‘with the 
progress of time, there arose as leaders of unmusical illegality poets who, though by 
nature poetical, were ignorant of what was just and lawful in music; and they, being 
frenzied and unduly possessed by a spirit of pleasure, mixed’ the different genres, 
pretending as ‘the best criterion […] the pleasure of the auditor, be he a good man or a 
bad’ (700d-e). The consequences were fatal – and here the quote has to be quite long: in 
this way ‘they bred in the populace a spirit of lawlessness in regard to music, and the 
effrontery of supposing themselves capable of passing judgment on it. Hence the 
theater-goers became noisy instead of silent, as though they knew the difference between 
good and bad music, and in place of an aristocracy in music there sprang up a kind of 
base theatrocracy. For if in music, and music only, there had arisen a democracy of free 
men, such a result would not have been so very alarming; but as it was, the universal 
conceit of universal wisdom and the contempt for law originated in the music, and on 
the heels of these came liberty. For, thinking themselves knowing, men became fearless; 
and audacity begat effrontery. For to be fearless of the opinion of a better man, owing to 
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self-confidence, is nothing else than base effrontery; and it is brought about by a liberty 
that is audacious to excess’ (700e-1b). 
 In the next passage, the consequences are shortly elaborated. They contain two 
points are of particular interest for our modern world. First, the eventual consequences 
of such decay, through a series of steps, would be a reverting to the ‘original’ state, the 
idea that would be taken up by Hobbes. Second, the main figures who exemplify such an 
error are the Titans, alluding to the figure of Prometheus and his revolt, hero of the 
Sophists, in particular Protagoras, and hero again of the modern champions of 
Enlightenment and technological progress. 
 
It would seem that Plato and his ideas have won. Intellectually, the Sophists were 
certainly defeated. Even their writings were lost, with only a few fragments surviving; our 
textbooks about the history of philosophy tell us, literally without exception, that all 
philosophy since then follows the footsteps of Plato and Aristotle. Similarly, the theatre 
had also disappeared from both the Eastern and Western parts of the Roman Empire, 
well before the Goths sacked Rome. Yet, one should be on guard from complacency. 
The theatre returned, towards the end of the Renaissance, not only marking and 
representing its end but being one of the main operators of this collapse, and so today 
we happen to live again in a kind of ‘theatrocracy’. Similarly, our intellectual environment 
is dominated by all kinds of intellectual movements and schools of thought that can 
technically be defined as Sophist. 
 We now need to investigate how did this happen. Given the limits of this paper, 
two episodes will be singled out for attention, both having a decisive role in the rise of 
the modern theatrocracy: the survival of the Sophist schools in the Byzantine Empire; 
and their transmission to the West, around the Fall of Constantinople, that sparked the 
re-birth of theatre in the West. 
 
The striking resiliance of Sophistry 
 
The intellectual victory of Plato by no means represented the disappearance of Sophists 
from the public scene. Their schools survived as part of the Hellenistic landscape, and 
were as if waiting for the occasion to multiply and gain dominance again. We need to 
recall here that the Sophists were first of all mimetic teachers, requiring liminal situations 
for their influence to spread quickly; and that therefore their activities showed particular 
affinities with the emergence of Empires, or Empire-like entities. One of their most 
lethal impacts was to influence Athenian politicians in the direction of Empire-building 
activities. This is why they again came back to prominence in the 2nd and 3rd centuries 
AD, with the transformation of the Roman Republic into an Empire, and its 
consolidation (Brunschwig and Lloyd 2000: 973); again in several steps in the Byzantine 
Empire; and then again, in the 19-20th centuries, with the rise of colonialisation and the 
transformation of the US into a quasi-Empire. 
The teachings of the Sophists had a much greater affinity with the ‘needs’ of an 
Empire than that of the philosophers, as they were not interested in an autonomous 
educational system concerned with the search for truth and the academic freedom 
associated with such research, rather with the training of certain skills in public officials, 
and the freedom of rhetoric. While pretending to create a genuine ‘Renaissance’ of 
learning, they were only ‘courtier Sophists’ who could be best described as ‘wordsmiths’ 
(Anderson 1993: 35). The interest in the Byzantine world for Plato and Aristotle was very 
limited: among the writings of Aristotle, it was restricted to logics, and it was this 
Aristotle that was transmitted to the Paris scholastics, seriously side-tracking European 
thinking already in the 12th century;2 while Plato was even more neglected, given that his 
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metaphysics was considered as a competitor of Christian orthodoxy, and that the 
Symposium was widely (mis)read as the propagation of some kind of drunken orgy as the 
philosophical way of life (Anderson 1993: 178-9). Interest in Plato was only rekindled by 
Michael Psellos, by far the most important Byzantine thinker, who considered himself ‘ 
“a lone philosopher in an age without philosophy” ’ (Duffy 2002: 148), bringing 
philosophy “ ‘back to life” ’ (Ibid.: 155); but who, driven by his insatiable curiosity and 
thirst for knowledge, mingled Plato’s ideas with Chaldean oracles and Hermetic writings 
(Ibid.: 147-8), which would generate enormous confusions on its own. 
 Concerning the actual content of their teaching, members of this ‘Second 
Sophistry’ focused on the so-called ‘progymnasmata’ exercises, which meant the 
systematic hammering of a limited number of selected texts in order to perform oratory 
speeches, including the explicit play with paradoxes. Such techniques include ‘ekphratic 
description’, which implied learning how to do a systematic, rhetorical description of a 
piece of poetry or a painting; the technique of proofs and refutations; and encomium, that 
would be rendered famous by Erasmus, which meant the appropriation of the right 
technique of flattery through lavishing praise and blame, rendering it intellectually 
exciting through paradoxes and double meanings (Anderson 1993: 47-8). The Second 
Sophistry also devoted particular attention to novels, focusing in particular on learning 
‘pleasurable’, erotic storytelling.  
The central figures whose writings and exercises would be endlessly reproduced, 
until the end of the Byzantine world, were Philostratus of Athens (who was really from 
Lemnos), and Hermogenes of Tarsus (which was the city of St Paul). Philostratus was 
the main ideologue of the ‘Second Sophistry’, giving even its name. His main 
contribution in this respect was to turn the tables against the philosophers. While Plato 
famously argued that the Sophists were mere imitators, for Philostratus these are the 
philosophers who are pseudos, only trying to imitate the Sophists (Brunschwig and Lloyd 
2000: 972-3). This is because the Second Sophistry operated a radical operation on the 
meaning of ‘truth’, the central term of philosophy. On the one hand, with its explicit 
interest in novels, it purported to rebuke the philosophical charge of pseudos by 
acknowledging that such novels were indeed products of fantasy, while claiming that 
philosophers, acting in bad faith, pretended that their dialogues were not constructs of 
the human intellectual but literally true. On the other hand it pretended a genuine interest 
in truth by complementing such explicitly fictional works with the collection of an 
enormous amount of disjoined historical facts. In this way the ‘paradigm of truth has 
thus been transformed’ (Ibid.: 973); the unity of the philosophical undertaking was 
broken into the schismogenic doubles of seductive fantasy writing and a positivistic 
gathering of facts, combined with an interest in lifeless grammar and logic. The texts of 
Hermogenes were transmitted with particular care by the important 9th century scholar 
Photius (820-91), considered as a great preserver of the writings of the classics (Lemerle 
1986). Photius, however, had little interest in Plato (Duffy 2002: 144), but was strongly 
influenced by Hermogenes (Lemerle 1986: 226-7), whose writings he knew ‘perfectly’ – 
just as it was true of his most highly regarded contemporary, another figure of ‘Byzantine 
humanism’, Arethas (c.850-944). Strikingly, even Chrysoloras, who is supposed to have 
‘transplanted’ the true Plato from Constantinople to Italy, was interested in Hermogenes, 
not in Plato or Aristotle (Monfasani 2004, I:13). 
 The most important Sophist schools of Late Antiquity are associated with 
Libanius in Antioch (4th century) and Procopius and Choricius in Gaza (late 5th-early 6th 
centuries) – interestingly enough, both in the Levant. Libanius loved to present himself 
as a persecuted victim of officialdom (Anderson 1993: 26), but he led the comfortable 
life of a court Sophist, heading a school of rhetoric, and leaving behind an enormous 
amount of indigestible and repetitive writings. Libanius was a great bore,3 but also a lover 
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of actors and dancers, having written an Oration on dancing and in defence of 
pantomimes. 
The Gaza School of Sophists, led by Procopius and then Choricius, flourished 
shortly before the Islamic conquest, and was particularly renowned of its eloquence. This 
area, perhaps paradoxically given its closeness to the Holy Land, was one of the last in 
the region to convert to Christianity, and the extent to which its main figures were 
Christian is still debated. Choricius in particular is a highly enigmatic figure, given that 
very little is know concerning the details of his life (Pummer 2002: 245), and for some 
strange reasons any reference to him is absent in the extant correspondence of his 
teacher and predecessor as head of the Gaza School, Procopius (Amato 2009: 261). His 
‘Oration in Defence of Mimes’ is an extremely strange and paradoxical text, given that 
mimes were uniformly considered disreputable, and even Lucian or Libanius only 
defended the more acceptable pantomimes. Such defence was based on a standard 
model: on the one hand, such shows were simple and trivial matters, harmless pastimes, 
and only dry pedants would find them objectionable; on the other, through a twist of 
argument so typical of the Sophists, they were declared as having a positive educational 
value, as the committers of moral faults are punished; but in order to understand the 
nature of the error, such acts – in particular adultery – had to be reproduced on the stage, 
and in great graphic detail.4 This text was therefore possibly written as a deliberate 
provocation, and at any rate rules out the possibility of Choricius being a Christian 
(Barnes 1996: 179). 
Choricius exerted a particularly strong influence on the teaching of rhetoric in the 
10-11th centuries, when he was revered for the educational value of his writings (Amato 
2009: 264). Thus, for e.g. in the Florilegium Marcianum, the earliest and widely used 
educational compendium, he is the leading authority with 92 citations, followed by famed 
Cappadocian Church fathers like Basil of Caesarea (74 citations), and Gregory of 
Nazianzus (70 citations), and then the Old Testament (63 citations) (Ibid.: 267). 
 
Such a great resilience on the part of the Sophists must have had a reason, beyond their 
skill in rhetorical flattery and in training the officials of an Empire. Graham Anderson 
offers a very simple and convincing argument, which is also quite depressing, as it shows 
that the claim about truth always winning in the end might not be so self-evident. 
Sophists are imitators, so they can imitate philosophers, even very carefully, so drawing a 
distinction between a Sophist and a philosopher can be quite difficult; while philosophers 
don’t imitate the Sophists, and therefore can be at a loss (Anderson 1993: 142-3). We 
might add that the only tools at their disposal is ‘Socratic irony’ – which, however, again 
requires the flair of recognition. 
 
 
Ferrara, the incubator of modern theatrocracy 
 
The idea of attributing a major role to Ferrara in the history of Italy in the 15th century 
would immediately seem to be a Sophist search for paradox. Still, such a role was indeed 
recognised by one of the greatest, if today not often cited classic figure of the field, Jacob 
Burckhardt, who dared to call Ferrara ‘the first really modern city in Europe’ (Burckhardt 
1995: 33). The fact of this claim, and the reasons given for it, deserves utmost interest. 
Burckhardt did not simply call Ferrara a major centre of the Renaissance, but outright 
modern. This is due to its championing a number of features that we associate with 
‘modern’ cities (and which Lewis Mumford connected to the baroque): it had large and 
well-built residential quarters; it promoted the formation of ‘true capital’, through the 
concentration of the official classes and the active promotion of trade; it attracted as a 
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matter of policy wealthy fugitives, much the way the Switzerland would do it later; its 
power was based on a very extensive and effective taxation system; and as a result the 
state employees deemed most important, soldiers and university professors, were always 
paid promptly (Ibid.). 
 Such a well-ordered state, however, had to pay a price in a feature that we don’t 
like to associate with the adjective ‘modern’: it was also perhaps the most ruthless 
despotism in its own time. The term ‘despotism’ here is not an exercise in labelling, but 
was the self-definition of the state, and in a manner that is not far from the 
contemporary meaning of the term (Gundersheimer 1973). In the 12th century, during 
the formation of the Italian city-states, Ferrara opted not for a Republic, but for a 
despotic form of government, offering the city to the Este family in a manner that 
almost anticipates the Leviathan of Hobbes. Despotism in Ferrara was therefore 
legitimate, surviving until 1597 (when the city, for reasons of succession, was yielded to 
the Papal State), while the Este rule survived in Modena until 1797, to be ended by the 
Napoleonic troops – coincidentally in the same year when Napoleon also terminated the 
millennial Republic of Venice. The ‘modernity’ of Ferrara thus implied pioneering a kind 
of absolutist ‘court society’ that became the rule of Europe only by the 17th century. 
 A crucial element of this ‘modernity’ was a truly unique promoting of a particular 
kind of humanist studies and the arts which, both literally (geographically and 
historically) and metaphorically in between Florence and Venice, Ferrara came to 
champion. In this, and in manifold ways, theatre and theatricality played a prominent 
role. 
Even further, Ferrara not only ‘played’ a pioneering role in the re-birth of theatre, 
but itself was theatrical: its promotion of the arts and humanities ‘emanated from a 
theatrical Ferrara that was itself a stage, a protagonist, a producer and generator of 
theatre, an object of representation’ (Clubb 2005: 345). Perhaps the best way to 
characterise such an overwhelming theatricality is through the words of Torquato Tasso, 
Ferrara’s most famous poet, who in a dialogue (incidentally subtitled ‘On Masks’) records 
the first impressions he had when seeing the city in the following manner: ‘ “When I first 
saw Ferrara … it seemed to me that the whole city was a marvellous, painted shining 
stage never seen before, full of thousands of shapes and apparitions. And the goings-on 
of that time seemed similar to those performed in theatres in different languages by 
various players” ’ (as in Bruscagli 2005: 42-3).  
Just as the putting into motion of any engine requires the use of several gears, the 
launching of Ferrara as a major centre of the humanities and the arts went through a 
series of accelerating steps. It started under Alberto d’Este (1388-93), who founded the 
University in 1391 (Lockwood 2009: 11). It continued with Niccolo III d’Este, who ruled 
almost for half a century (1393-1441), entrusting Donato with the task of building up a 
library, and who used his long journeys abroad, especially in France, collecting works of 
art and musical instruments (Ibid.: 13). The most important developments in Ferrara, 
however, are to be connected with Leonello d’Este. 
 Leonello was younger brother and designated heir of Niccolo III, trained to be a 
ruler and a commander, and so after his return to the court in 1424 had to find himself 
idle. Intriguingly, nothing is known of his life in between 1424 and 1429, arrival of 
Guarino in Ferrara, though one can safely conjecture that two events of 1425 left a 
profound mark on it: one of his brothers and a consort of his father were executed on 
charges of adultery; and the humanist Panormita published a much discussed poem 
entitled Hermaphrodite, which reached unprecedented heights in pornography, so much so 
that it contained a whole series of invented Latin words. All that we know is that 
Guarino was repeatedly called to Ferrara in order to become Leonello’s tutor; and that in 
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1429 he finally accepted. The result was the literal transformation of the court itself (or at 
least Leonello’s part) into the most famous humanist school of Italy. 
 The question now is to assess what such a thing exactly meant. For this, we need 
to present who Guarino was; what he promised; and what he actually did. 
 
Guarino: Humanist Educator or Corrupter of Youth? 
The bare facts concerning the life of Guarino are rather well known. Born in 1374, 
Guarino da Verona (or Guarino Veronese) did his humanistic studies in the 1390s in 
Verona (Baxandall 1965: 185). He then became one of the main students of the famed 
Manuel Chrysoloras, the first known Greek scholar to spend a long time in Europe,5 
following him back to Constantinople in 1403, where stayed for five years as his house-
guest, gaining good knowledge of Greek language, and also of Greek theatricality 
(Villoresi 1994: 65ff). Upon his return, he lived and taught in Florence (1410-14), and 
then in Venice (1414 and 1419), after which he moved back to his home-town, Verona. 
In 1429 he finally accepted the call to Ferrara, where he died in the advanced age of 86 
years. Since then, his students and acolytes celebrate him as one of the biggest figures of 
the Renaissance; certainly its greatest pedagogue. However, there are quite a few aspects 
of his life that require closer scrutiny.  
 This starts with the fact that Guarino was not exactly a youngster when he 
became a student of Chrysoloras. The exact date of Chrysoloras’s first trip to Europe is 
quite controversial; but what is certain is that Guarino was almost thirty when he went 
with Chrysoloras to Constantinople. It is even stranger how he got into Chrysoloras’ 
entourage in the first instance. Chrysoloras was a high level diplomat of the Empire, 
while Guarino was not even a noble. Concerning his unique chance of spending five full 
years in the place where everybody wanted to be, there is no record of his experiences. 
The years spent upon his return are also perplexing. Five years in Florence, five years in 
Venice, yet not settling in any of them; then seemingly wasting ten years of his life in the 
backwaters of Verona. What was Guarino waiting for? What was he up to?! 
 At one level, the answer to this question seems to be straightforward, told 
endlessly by his students and acolytes ever since. Guarino was a great pedagogue; his 
only aim was to teach, to educate, instilling knowledge and virtue into every one of his 
students. Yet, these are exactly the loftiest of such praises, attempting to secure belief 
about the perfect orthodoxy and modernity of Guarino’s aims that strike such high note, 
and peculiar pitch, to render one suspicious. Accordingly, the aim of Guarino was not 
simply to teach, but outright to ‘form living souls’ (as quoted in Grafton and Jardine 
1982: 51), in order to ‘transform the world’. Thus, students were ‘altered’ in his schools, 
literally transformed, so they ‘came out as new men’. When reading such passages one 
has to wonder whether Garin had in mind the manner in which Protestant evangelist are 
trying to transform their flock born again Christians, or the Soviet Bolshevik vision of 
the ‘smithery of the new man’. However, it is also evident that in such an ambitious 
undertaking Guarino had rather more partial, quite strategic and less evidently 
praiseworthy aims. His presumed promotion of ancient values had a very concrete and 
earthly target: ‘Guarino not only founded and developed a premier humanistic tradition 
in the city, he also tried to disconnect Ferrara from traditional northern culture by 
rejecting it as obsolete and unacceptable’ (Bruscagli 2005: 31). This might still be 
conceived of as merely promoting the values in which he sincerely believed; but – given 
the life experiences of Guarino – it makes one wonder whether Guarino wanted to 
reanimate the ancient glory of the Greco-Roman world, or whether, more simply, he 
wanted to ‘byzantinise’ Europe. Given that his beloved teacher, Chrysoloras was a prime 
diplomat of the Byzantine Empire, trying to secure the survival of Byzantine culture and 
values in the West, this by no means was an unlikely scenario. And if this were the case, 
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one can by no means rule out, given the importance the alchemic writings of the 
hermetic corpus had for the Byzantine dotti, that Guarino was well aware of the ‘need’ for 
an environment where such Byzantine values could be incubated; and that for such 
purposes Ferrara offered a better case that Florence or Venice – even that delay, in the 
proper manner, leaving the patient ‘cooked’ in his own sweat, might be the best way to 
prepare for the opportunity. 
 From this perspective, the events of 1429 even suggest a reason for making the 
decisive move. It is usually explained by a ‘push’ motive, the plague outbreak that 
supposedly chased Guarino out of Verona, ready to accept the Ferrara offer. But there 
was also a pull motive: it was exactly at that moment that a number of new plays by 
Plautus were discovered. Guarino was absolutely adamant to obtain them; and Ferrara 
seemed the ideal place both for procuring them and for turning them to use. 
 In order to understand Guarino’s – on surface, quite surprising – interest in the 
comedies of Plautus, we need to turn to the actual content of his teachings – all the more 
so as we need to assess whether he managed to satisfy the high and lofty expectation that 
he himself evoked. 
 
Guarino is usually presented as a great erudite scholar, a true Renaissance man, ‘the 
greatest teacher in a century of great teachers’ (Grafton and Jardine 1982: 52), at home in 
all areas of knowledge and wisdom, and making a fundamental contribution to the 
revitalisation of interest in Plato. This assessment is hugely off the mark. Guarino was 
indeed very competent, but only in a very narrow field of knowledge, which by no means 
included Plato (Thomson 1976), and which moreover was closely based on 
monopolising the advantage that he acquired by spending five years in Constantinople. 
This explains the life-long hostility between himself and Filelfo, the only other significant 
contemporary scholar who shared this monopoly of being the first, last and only ones 
being able to gain first-hand knowledge of Greek. 
 Far from being guided by the works and spirit of Plato, Guarino based his 
teaching on a veneration of Chrysoloras’s work and person that bordered on the fanatical 
(Baxandall 1965: 190). He was convinced that Chrysoloras was the greatest thinker of his 
times. Yet, the Byzantine was more of a diplomat than a genuine scholar, and his true 
worth can be better gained from a recent, comprehensive overview of Byzantine 
philosophy, where his works are not discussed, nor is his name mentioned in an 
extensive list of important thinkers in the Palaeologan period (13th-15th centuries) 
(Ierodaikonou 2002: 5-6). The crucial point was not the significance of his own ideas – as 
he had none; neither his support for Plato – which was non-existent; but that he rejected, 
on false premises, the entire line of humanism started by Petrarch, inaugurating and 
break and a new – false – start. The continuity was only maintained, as a ‘rock’, by 
Cusanus (Berschin 1988: 276) and, after some pentimenti, by Alberti; but the ‘spirit of the 
times’ preferred the line of Chrysoloras and his students. 
 
But what was actually taught in the lectures and seminars of this ‘great, great’ teacher and 
scholar? A relatively recent overview by two major scholars came up with a rather 
striking reassessment. Between the lofty claims made by and on behalf of Guarino and 
his actual teaching practice there was a yawning gap. It was pretended that the studies 
would help to set ‘ “in order the impulses of our souls, and reins in our desires” ’; to 
teach ‘ “faith, constancy, fairness and liberality towards friends and foreigners, and 
respect for all sorts of men” ’; in sum the ‘ “very philosophy that once upon a time 
brought men from their wild life into this gentle and domesticated condition and which 
gave them the laws that enabled those assembled together to become a civil society” ’ (as 
in Grafton and Jardine 1982: 54). In actual fact, the lectures were exclusively devoted, in 
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painstaking, indeed gruesome detail, to the hammering of linguistic, grammatical and 
rhetorical skills (Ibid.: 52). The core of the curriculum was the reading of epic poetry and 
drama; fundamentally the very same curriculum taught by the Greek Sophists in Athens, 
in the transition from oral to written culture, which then was taken over by the Romans 
from Greece, then by the Byzantines, and now re-imported into Italy and adapted as the 
fountainhead of all wisdom (pp. 55-8). 
 Yet, even within these broad and rather unsatisfactory coordinates, the 
insufficiencies of which composed a central part of Plato’s complaints against Sophist 
education, Guarino followed a particularly gruelling practice. The teaching had two main 
characteristics. On the one hand, the grammatical rules and rhetorical exercised were put 
into short, rhythmic and rhyming, easily memorisable verses. The silliness of all this can 
be illustrate with four lines (p.64): 
 
A hill is a collis; a caules, I’m told,  
Is a plant, and a caula keeps sheep in the fold.  
A collum bows down with the weight of the head  
That it holds, while a colum’s for spinning a thread. 
 
Second, literally every single line read in the lectures was expanded upon and illustrated 
with commentaries, which in print usually run up to a full page length. The purported 
reason was to illustrate the need for erudition, and Guarino certainly did everything to 
show off his; but the effective outcome was that students were inundated with words, 
just as with an ‘as comprehensive a catalogue as possible of disconnected “facts” ’ (67). 
Thus they became bewildered and lost in details, not being able even to copy the flood of 
words pouring on them as a result of this ‘linguistic drilling’ (66). 
 The course on grammar was followed by a course on rhetoric; but the method of 
teaching did not change. Instead of providing living contact with the subject matter, 
Guarino focused on a single text, which was not even an important classic work, rather a 
forgery of Cicero’s style (70). He thus revealed himself a Sophist, in the technical sense 
assigned to the term by Plato, who is quite able of dissecting and fragmenting every piece 
of living reality, but is not able to put it back harmoniously together (Sophist 259d-60e). 
 The result of attending such lectures, devoid of even trying to cater for genuine 
attention and to render alive great classic texts was utter boredom. Guarino justified his 
way of proceeding as the ‘price’ students had to pay in order to gain access to the 
‘mysteries’ into which he was initiating them (Grafton and Jardine 1982: 66), and was 
gravely pondering, as a true pedant – a stock figure of the rising ‘erudite comedy’, of 
which he was model – about the ‘heavy responsibility’ that befall upon him, in directing 
the soul of youth in the right direction. Yet, at the same time, and inevitably, given the 
gruesome boredom to which he subjected his students day by day, and pretending to be 
a ‘good father’, he also showed lenience and understanding towards them. This is best 
visible in his interest in and support for comedies.  
 
Already contemporaries were puzzled by the fact that this supposed great scholar and 
unmistakable pedant had a penchant for comedies. Already during his time in 
Constantinople he translated three satirical dialogues of the ‘irreverent prose satirist’ 
Lucian, whose writings exuded the ‘spirit of hedonism and paradox’ (Marsh 1994: 419-
21). His justification for this was paradoxical, modelled on the paradoxical character of 
Lucian’s writings: comedies, by staging ‘bad’ forms of conduct, actually help the students 
(or readers or listeners) to become aware of such errors, and therefore follow now 
‘consciously’ the ‘good’ way of conduct. The source is again Chrysoloras: recent research 
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has shown that already in 1397-1400, when teaching in Florence, Chrysoloras used the 
writings of Lucian as a pedagogical tool (Marsh 1994: 419). 
 It is very important not to take such an argument at face value, and especially not 
consider it in isolation, rather capture the core of the entire pedagogical attitude of which 
it lies at its heart. The central point concerns the schismatic nature of the combination of 
extreme boredom on the one hand, and the subsequent need for ‘relaxation’ and 
‘divertissement’. From this perspective the support for lascivious comedy is not an 
understandable gesture towards the necessities of human nature, rather a pact of 
complicity tied between the ‘master’ and his students, who tolerate the dreadful dreg of 
the lectures in compensation for the master closing his eyes, or even adding a 
complacent, self-gratulatory wink, over such ‘understandable’ pranks. Education in this 
way is transformed into a genuine corruption of the youth, in the etymological sense of 
corruption as a joint break, implying the ‘understanding’ and complicity of both sides in 
sabotaging the true, Platonic aim of education, which is to elevate the soul into the 
apprehension, perception and comprehension of the true, the good, and the beautiful. 
The effects of this educational policy is visible in particular clarity through as series of 
poems written by one of his students, Janus Pannonius (1434-72), considered the first 
and foremost Hungarian humanist and poet of the century, which give a glimpse into an 
astonishing proliferation of debauched promiscuity, whoring, and sodomising. One of 
the more striking of these poems in entitled ‘To Guarino of Verona’; it is organised 
around the – rhetorical – question whether Guarino was truly oblivious of what was 
going on around him, or just faked ignorance. 
 
That this matter is not just a minor taint on the otherwise noble character of Guarino’s 
educational programme is best visible in the very core of the education philosophy of 
Chrysoloras; a point where, by the way, he indeed deviated even from the basic principles 
of Byzantine aesthetics, presenting again a thoroughly anti-Platonic argument. The 
argument concerns the nature of beauty, and has fundamental relevance both for the 
arts, and for education in general. 
 According to Chrysoloras, ‘real’ beauty is not external, but internal. It does not 
reside in objects, whether these are natural or works of art, but only in the intellect that 
contemplates them, as it is only through such activity that we come close to the maker of 
these objects, God. So the only ‘ “truly philosophical activity” ’ is to think about the 
Mind that shaped all these things; and this activity can only be acquired through watching. 
However, he immediately adds, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, that he by no 
means have in mind some kind of voyeurism; quite on the contrary, ‘looking at the 
beauties of women […] is licentious and base’ (Baxandall 1965: 197-8). 
 This position is an extremely shrewd and dangerous piece of sophistry. It start by 
distracting the attention of the listener, as the first point about ‘inner’ beauty seem just a 
standard piece of Platonic or Christian orthodoxy. Its spirit, however, is the exactly 
opposite of that of the Timaeus, or the Itinerary of St Bonaventure. For Plato, just as for 
Bonaventure, the starting point for an elevation towards the divine is a recognition of 
beauty, thus leaving behind the self. For Chrysoloras, however, the denigration of 
objective beauty is compounded with the elevation of the contemplating mind, the mind 
of the pure theorist, thus his own mind, into some kind of direct contact with the divine. 
At the same time, it propels the mere activity of watching, or the position of the external 
spectator, or the outsider, who does not participate, into the par excellence philosophical 
position, while still promoting misogyny, and even transforms act of voyeurism into a 
secret mystery and forbidden fruit. 
One might consider that such a position is imminently alien to artistic activity. 
Guarino, and many of the ‘humanists’, were indeed hostile to the visual arts. Yet, 
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Guarino’s teaching exerted a crucial impact on two arts that would play a central role in 
and through Ferrara: painting and dancing. 
 
Pisanello: the Sophist as painter 
The painter most closely associated with the Ferrara of Guarino is one of the most 
enigmatic figures of Quattrocento painting, Pisanello. Details of his life are little known 
even by the standards of the age, while his works fared particularly badly, with only three 
frescoes and four tables surviving, and not all in good condition. But a large number of 
his drawings are available, allowing a clear understanding of the mind of this extremely 
particular, and in many respects very ‘modern’ painter – though we have to be aware of 
the fact that being a ‘modern’ painter in Quattrocento Italy is not necessarily a praise. 
The modernity of Pisanello can be shown by applying to his paintings a term 
coined by Tom Wolfe for 20th century art: ‘painted words’. They put into practice the 
principles taught by Guarino about ‘ekphratic exercises’, best represented in the famous 
description given by Lucian about Apelles’s Calumny. In such a description the emphasis 
was not on the aesthetical qualities of the painting, the evocation of beauty that it 
impressed on the soul of those who contemplated the image, rather on idiosyncratic 
connections that existed among its elements, and which allowed themselves to be 
decoded and described in a coherent and consistent manner by the initiate. 
 The ekphratic aspect of Pisanello’s paintings can be reconstructed with particular 
clarity with the help of his drawings. Their two main characteristic features are a primary 
interest in variety, combined with a focus on internal consistency as well, and a focus on 
physiognomic expressiveness (Baxandall 1965: 194-5). Pisanello prepared every minute 
detail on his frescoes through painstaking and minuscule exercises in drawing. If he had 
to paint a horse, he prepared a series of drawings about horses, after nature, that showed 
in minute detail the nostrils of the horses; just as the spur on the boot of the knight had 
to be absolutely perfect (see Fig. 1.; Syson and Gordon 2001). All this only demonstrated 
the true craftsmanship and dedication of Pisanello as a professional artist, one could say, 
and this is certainly true; however, the overall impression of his paintings leaves one 
wondering, as such a profusion of details not only seems superfluous, but also renders 
the viewer first lost and then outright disoriented. With all their undeniable virtuosity, the 
images of Pisanello are dead and cold. They reflect the mind of an anatomist who 
dissected with great precision every single component, but exactly for this very reason 
they assume, and reproduce, a frightening, deadly distance: the void that separated the 
artist from the beings he ‘dissected’ in his drawings. It is this experience that is 
reproduced in the viewer, and not some kind of awe or marvelling, the Platonic 
thaumazein, which is the truly philosophical counterpart of artistic experience. 
 Such an impression is reinforced by the second aspect of these paintings, their 
physiognomic expressiveness. While this in a way complements the first aspect, the 
outcome is not the harmonious coexistence of parts, rather a schismatic tension 
emerging between two opposite extremes. Time and again, the cold objectivity of the 
artist, and of the viewer, is changed into a kind of emotional involvement, but one that is 
procured not by loving care, rather by the discovery of a protruding, ugly or disgusting, 
revolting yet strangely attractive detail. In the Verona fresco ‘Saint George and the 
Princess of Silena’ in the background, just above the saint, there are the corpses of two 
hanged man twisting around, for which Pisanello again carefully prepared drawings, after 
‘nature’, and which have absolutely nothing to do with the narrative (Fig.2.). But 
Pisanello is not guided by Alberti’s concern with narrative unity, which only put into 
words the long practice of Western art, emphasizing narrativity; rather by the spirit of 
ekphrasis, where the painting is only made for the clever Sophist who is smart enough to 
perceive all these minuscule details and to collect them together in a poem that celebrates 
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the ‘fantasy’ and ‘inventiveness’ of the artist, and also his ‘closeness’ to nature. Such 
wanton emotionality is raised to a new pitch on the left side of the image, where the 
dragon is visible, not done with by the hero, as it is usually represented. Quite on the 
contrary, it rather ‘lurks on the shores of the lake’, and its effective presence is marked 
‘by a grisly assortment of bones, lizards and a slain doe’, and – as this were not gruesome 
enough – Pisanello even captures ‘a lion [that] prepares to spring on to a frightened stag’ 
(Fig.3.) (Syson and Gordon 2001: 25). The description of not simply hunting scenes, but 
the way in which animals were actually, physically captured and killed off by dogs was 
also a pet subject matter of Pisanello, just as for one of his main sources, the Limbourg 
brothers – who, just as himself, worked for courts, in their case the Burgundy court; but, 
where, in both cases, the models were Byzantine. The representation of the dragon as 
alive is by no means incidental, as in the London National Gallery table ‘The Virgin and 
Child with Saints Anthony Abbot and George’ the dragon is again alive and kicking, or 
rather twisting and twirling around the legs of St George, and is snarling at the boar – or 
perhaps at Saint Anthony next to the boar (pp. 140-1, 143). 
 Moving from unsolicited scenes of violence to a different but not less perplexing 
register, another weird feature of the Verona fresco, certainly inserted in order to be 
identified in ekphratic exercises, is the protruding back of a horse that takes up centre 
stage just between the Saint and the Princess (Fig.4.). One might wonder what the horse, 
and especially such an enormous back, has to do with the story, or in general with 
aesthetic experience. The solution lies in another table, again in the London National 
Gallery, ‘The Vision of Saint Eustace’, which has again a huge horse dominating it, and – 
even though this time it is not put on centre stage – it has its back part open towards the 
viewer, depicted in absolute natural details. The intentions of the artist are rendered 
crystal clear by study drawings for the horse in the Louvre, where not only the horse’s 
nose, eyes and hoofs are coloured, but in the ‘horse’s hindquarters’ specifically ‘the 
testicles and the anus’ as well (Fig.5.) (pp. 171, 4). 
 There is every reason to assume that not simply Pisanello’s painting style had 
affinities with Guarino’s style, but that he was trained, or initiated, into the ‘mysteries’ of 
ekphratic painting by Guarino. The praises heaped on him by Guarino are widely quoted, 
and an allusion in a 1416 Guarino letter almost certainly refers to him. A series of 
circumstantial evidence indicates even longer and stricter contacts. Pisanello was brought 
up in Verona, which was Guarino’s native city as well, and at the time Guarino was back 
from Constantinople Pisanello was just about 16-18 years old. They were then in Venice 
again at the same time, in between 1414/5 and 1419, when Guarino was teaching there, 
and Pisanello is supposed to work with Gentile da Fabriano; then again in the 1420s, 
when both Guarino and Pisanello were living in Verona; and then again in much of the 
1430s and especially 1440s, when Guarino always and Pisanello often were in Ferrara. If 
we add that Pisanello’s father, who died when his son was very young, was from Pisa, 
which after Venice was the most important port and community linked to the Byzantine 
world, it is not too risky to assume that there was a long-standing and thoroughly 
Byzantine connection between the two. 
 
Something similar can be said about another area of the arts where Ferrara played a 
pioneering role in the Quattrocento, and where the decisive influence of Guarino was 
hardly at all recognized so far, the field of court dancing – moving closer to explicit 
connections with the theatre. 
 
Domenico: The ‘Dancing Revolution’ 
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It is well known that in the 15th century Ferrara was the main centre of dance music in 
Europe: ‘All of the best known masters of the newly codified art of court dance in Italy, 
down to the 1480s, are closely linked to Ferrara, in some cases for long periods as 
members of the official entourage’ (Lockwood 2009: 76). The three main figures in this 
regard were Domenico da Piacenza (c.1390-1470), Giovanni Ambrosio (or Guglielmo 
Ebreo da Pesaro, c.1420-1484), and Antonio Cornazzano (c.1430-1484), forming a kind 
of whole trinity (Arcangeli 2000: 26-7; Castelli 2005: 37-8). These developments started 
in Ferrara eventually resulted in the rise of French ballet and English court masque. 
However, such developments so far, except for some pioneering pages by Michael 
Baxandall, were not connected to the simultaneous presence in Ferrara of humanist 
education. 
 According to Baxandall, the figures in Pisanello’s paintings are arranged in 
groupings and patterns that much recall the arrangement of the dances that were 
characteristic of Ferrara court music (Baxandall 1988: 77). Even further, not only these 
paintings demonstrate a characteristically dance-like concern with body movements and 
gestures, but are also preoccupied with expressing, through such physical movements, 
the emotional states of the soul as it was explicitly propagated by dancing masters on the 
one hand, and theorists of painting like Alberti and Guarino on the other. The most 
important recognition of Baxandall, however, concerns the ‘semi-dramatic’ character of 
some of the best known Ferrara dances, like the ones entitled ‘Cupido’, ‘Jealousy’ or 
‘Phoebus’, each capturing a particular scenery related to erotic conquest, with the 
character of their movements being reminiscent of paintings by Pisanello, following 
Guarino, or Botticelli’s Primavera, that followed Alberti. 
 The most important impact of Guarino’s methodology, however, can be shown 
in the character of Domenico da Piacenza’s seminal book, which is credited to have 
created, almost ex nihilo, modern ‘academic’ dancing. That the dire sophistic pedantry of 
Guarino could have contributed to the foundation of modern dance music is such an 
extraordinary fact that so far it has remained unobserved. 
 
Domenico started his treatise by a defence of dancing along lines recalling Guarino’s (or 
Lucian’s) similar arguments (Tani 1957: 828). But his most important and properly 
sophistic achievement was the classification of the major dancing steps, considered as a 
‘capital moment’ in the history of dance. By such a classificatory scheme Domenico 
‘created a vocabulary of movements that could be used independently of the figurative 
scheme of individual dances, offering in this way “the possibility of extending almost to 
infinity the field of choreographic creation” ’ (Ibid.: 829, quoting Reyna). This claim, and 
the underlying achievement, is indeed extraordinary – but we need to analyse carefully 
what we are exactly talking about. 
 Dancing is one of the most involving, participatory human activities, which is 
highly mimetic, both in the sense that in any festivity once people start to dance – which 
is often not easy to initiate – then more or less everybody follows suit; and also in the 
sense that the knowledge of dancing is to be acquired by imitating the way others dance. 
Domenico’s idea of breaking this overwhelming, involving movement down into single 
moves seems trivial, and is indeed very simple to accomplish, almost mechanically, once 
one acquired the idea; but it requires, in the first instance, a frame of mind, comparable 
to Newton and the apples, of disconnecting oneself, almost violently, from the impulse 
of taking up the smooth, rhythmic movement, and becoming part of it, and instead 
concentrating on its simple component, by breaking the continuous movement up into 
its constitutive elements, comparable to the frames of a motion picture: one step on the 
left, two on the right; the hands here now, the head there then. The suspension of 
rhythm and the fragmentation of continuous movement is by no means a simple and 
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natural act, rather it is highly counter-intuitive, as it requires a prior step: assuming the 
position of the outsider; a position which one either has, or acquires, but that always 
implies a substantial price to pay: that of not participating, of not belonging, of not being 
part of the game. 
And yet, this sacrifice, if properly executed, has a high, literally almost infinite 
reward: once the movement is broken up into small segments, these segments can be 
taught and learned, and more or less everybody can acquire them, thus charming and 
seducing the objects of desire. Even further, these segments can be combined in a variety 
of ways, thus inventing ever newer steps and patterns of dancing. In other words, from a 
participatory experience in which somebody is swept away by the movement, 
abandoning himself or herself to the experience of dancing, and thus eventually making a 
spiritual contact with other human beings of the opposite gender who similarly 
abandoned themselves to the swaying movements, dancing becomes a carefully 
calculated art in which certain movements are skilfully or – which is the same thing – 
trick-fully executed in order to please, charm, hunt down and seduce. 
This, however, is still not the last word, as anybody who follows that logic to its 
conclusion soon realizes. Breaking up a continuous movement into a series of 
instrumentally conceived technical segments in order to acquire a predefined purpose or goal 
indeed involves the greatest sacrifice, as it has the consequence of losing forever the 
meaning of the aim. Dancing performed in order to purposefully evoke or provoke 
erotic feelings, thus to seduce, is a double-edged sword; it is easy to make it work: it is 
easy to seduce somebody, just as it is easy to make money; but it would never produce a 
genuine result, a real, involving feeling; it cannot lead to love.  
 
Having broken movement down into segments, Domenico proceeds to a meticulous 
interpretation of the differences between the various types of dances. The aim is to teach 
the steps, which he – again closely recalling Guarino – offers through a ‘mnemonic 
frame’ and a ‘rhythmic prose’ (829). In this way a genuine alchemic transformation is 
produced, as he can switch from one dance to another without breaking a (mechanised) 
rhythm – which certainly procured a tremendous success for those who took up his 
lesson, to the envy of all others watching it; though what was not realised is the 
enormous internal emptying produced by such a trick-ful exteriorisation of human 
emotions and movements.  
 Domenico’s innovations also implied a general change in the kind of dances 
performed; a shift away from the popular bassadanze, which consisted of a limited 
number of similar movements, the emphasis being on the participatory aspect of 
common dancing, to balls, where the movements were at the same time more organised 
and more varied, incorporating extensive mimic elements. This Domenico used to the 
full, on the one hand by starting to compose elaborate choreographies which mimicked 
the goings-on of everyday social life, preparing the way to theatrical like presentations, 
and eventually the ballet – a word whose first appearance can indeed be traced to his 
treatise; and on the other hand to more osé kind of allusive and bodily moves, away from 
the ‘noble’ dances where the bodies were not supposed to touch each other, into patterns 
were males took up carefully studied and ever more aggressive positions, purposefully 
not letting off the hands of the partner, and making ever more explicit simulating 
movements. In sum, Domenico not only founded dance as a technique, but his work has 
a ‘definitely modern’ character, founding a ‘new grammar of movements and steps’, and 
a ‘syntax of rigorously defined figurations’ (830).  
 
Given that practically nothing is known of the life of Domenico, we cannot know 
anything about the possible personal connections between him and Guarino. However, 
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just as in the case of Pisanello, a few conjectures can be formulated. Piacenza and Verona 
are mid-Northern cities in Italy, not that far from each other. We know that Domenico 
was in Ferrara by 1430, perhaps already before, thus arriving almost together with 
Guarino; and while he did not know Italian well, his writing had evident rhetorical 
qualities. So it might well have been that he had Byzantine origins, perhaps through his 
father, who might have been part of the first main spurt of Byzantine migrations, the last 
decade of the 14th century, the period associated with his birth. 
 
Masquerades and the cult of Hercules 
 
A central theme connecting the city of Ferrara, its humanist and artists was the cult of 
Hercules. Here the alchemic genius of Guarino was again working: the patron Saint of 
Ferrara was St George, which Guarino connected to the myth of Hercules, helping 
Pietro Andrea de’ Bassi to compose an epic poem that combined the features of St 
George and Hercules. The figure became so ‘essential to Este image-making’ that the 
heir to the throne, born just in 1431, was named Ercole; and that the d’Este even claimed 
descent from him (Bull 2004: 91; Syson and Gordon 2001: 100). Scenes taken from de’ 
Bassi’s epic poem became favourite themes of court artists, both in Ferrara and also 
Firenze, and it was through the representation of the naked Hercules in his various 
exploits, especially his struggle with Antaeus, that the central homoerotic theme of 
Renaissance arte developed, in particular by Pollaiuolo and Michelangelo (Simons 2008). 
 As it is only proper to a city which on the one hand all but transformed itself to a 
stage, and on the other pretended to trace its origins back to Hercules, that Hercules 
would even appear on its streets, as part of the famed 1433 masquerade procession, ‘a 
parade of gods led by Apollo with Hercules bringing up the rear’, dressed ‘ “wearing the 
skin of a lion and holding a club in his hand” ’ (Syson and Gordon 2001: 100), widely 
remembered as one of the first main masked processions in Italy, and a major step 
towards the birth of theatre, and the politics of spectacle, given that Cosimo de’ Medici 
was probably also in attendance, in exile from Florence. 
 From this Ferrara masquerade the first recognised theatrical spectacle was only a 
small step away. It was staged in Venice, but Ferrara and Guarino were thoroughly 
implicated, as Tito Livio de’ Frulivisi, the author, organiser and director of the staging 
was a native of Ferrara, and a student of Guarino. 
 
Tito Livio de’ Frulovisi 
 
One would expect that the pioneering figure of Renaissance theatre was an interesting 
character, and Frulovisi indeed fulfils such expectations. He was one of the most peculiar 
characters of Renaissance humanism, and yet exactly due to this he was also most 
revealing of this movement. His character stands out with particular clarity against the 
background of Venetian Renaissance humanism, as provided by Margaret King in her 
excellent 1986 book. Alone among the Venetian humanists of his age, Frulovisi rejected 
the central values of Venice, in particular the idea of unanimitas, and rather made fun of 
them in his impudent comedies, explicitly mocking them and defying the uniqueness and 
legitimacy of Venice (King 1986: 194-5). This makes one wonder about the specific life 
experiences that predisposed Frulovisi for such attitudes – and there are indeed a 
number of most interesting such details. 
 Frulovisi was born in Ferrara just around 1400, but about 1404 his father was 
exiled from the city and came to settle in Venice (King 1986: 378). He eventually became 
a resident there, but could never become happy with its constitution. He became a 
student of Guarino in Venice, when Frulovisi was in his late teens. In 1433 he offered to 
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the public two different sort of works, each milestones on their own: a humanist treatise 
on politics, entitled De Republica; and a series of humanist comedies. The first broke new 
ground by explicitly rejected the authority of Aristotle, arguing that political government 
is a purely human matter, having nothing to do with divine order. The latter inaugurated 
modern theatre. The first spectacle was performed in September 1433, followed by four 
other performances in the coming two years; all in Latin, and presented without any 
interlude or break (Paduan 1982: 12-6). As a most significant detail, mimes were present 
in the first spectacle, but – though announced in the prologue – were excluded from the 
second (Ibid.: 16). 
 Frulovisi was evidently searching for major recognition, as he dedicated his 
political work to Leonello d’Este, and staged his comedies in the Santo Basso church in 
Venice, which is just off the St Mark square, literally next to the main Cathedral. Such 
recognition, however, and understandably, was not granted; Ferrara ignored him, while 
the Venetians felt insulted, and he eventually had to leave the city. All this, and especially 
the details of his activities, already reveal what scholars working on him called a 
‘character’ or ‘personality’ fault: Frulovisi evidently lacked both virtue and judgment. In 
his first play he proclaimed himself as the proud author of the text, in contrast to the old, 
boring and trite comedies of the ancients (Smith 1998: 232); but when he was charged 
with plagiarism (see also Radcliff-Umstead 1969: 36), he retracted and in the Prologue of 
his second play he argued that himself and the author who accused him were both using 
a common source, Plautus. In this Prologue he also adamantly defended his sincere 
loyalty to the city, yet the fourth play amounted to a generalised attack on Venetian 
institutions and values, while his fifth and ultimate Venetian play contained a series of 
sharp personalised attacks, so evidently he was burning bridges (Smith 1998: 232-3). 
 From Venice, as a genuine masterstroke, he travelled to England, which at that 
time also started to become interested in Italian Renaissance humanism, in particular 
Ferrarese music, so he presented himself as a main representative of the movement. He 
filled a vacuum, and nobody was there to pull the plug, as genuine Venetian humanists 
were not interested in leaving their city. But his errors of judgment stayed with him. His 
epic poem written to flatter his host, Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester, produced the 
opposite result, as the story lingered too close to some troubled moments of his past. 
Frulovisi therefore had to leave again, and eventually abandoned humanism, retraining 
himself as a medic. Not before, however, that he actually made a major impact in 
England, as his biography of Henry V, the first biography ever written about an English 
monarch, of course written in the worst Sophist style of flattery, set a model there, and 
was used, whether directly or through secondary sources, even by Shakespeare; and is 
generally acknowledged as having set the stage for the ‘increasingly pervasive presence of 
Italians in England’ (Wyatt 2005: 29). 
 There are two issues of vital relevance concerning the career of Frulovisi, from 
the perspective of a Nietzschean ‘genealogy’: the exact nature of his formative influences, 
and the lasting effect exerted by him. Concerning the first, Frulovisi evidently 
misunderstood the teachings of Guarino, but he is by no means less interesting due to 
this fact; quite on the contrary. Guarino pitched his teaching for the sons of the high 
aristocracy, though it contained a fair amount of paradox and double play. Frulovisi 
evidently understood this only too well, but somehow did not manage to realise the exact 
intentions of Guarino, and the limitations of his own place, thus took the systematic 
undermining of aristocratic values and virtues only too seriously, trying to outsmart his 
master in his nihilistic critique, and of course failed. Concerning the effects, however, his 
work turned out to be genuinely epoch setting and momentous, in ways that are still far 
from being recognised.6 The best way to see it is through Leon Battista Alberti’s Momus, 
of which he might well have served as the model. 
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 The point here is not an antiquarian concern in identifying the exact source of 
Alberti’s work. But Momus has been recently identified as a seminal work that represents 
the reappearance of the Trickster in the horizon of the medieval world (Horvath 2008); 
and the fact that this coincides with the reappearance of the theatre in Europe, after an 
absence lasting for more than a millennia, is a matter of no minor interest. 
 The nature of the connections between Alberti and Frulovisi, and Alberti and 
Guarino and his school in general, makes the idea even more likely. Alberti got also lured 
by Guarino’s version of humanism, and in 1424 he wrote his famous play Philodoxeos, 
modelled among others after Guarino’s Lucian translations. Alberti imitated the models 
so well that contemporaries thought the play was written in Antiquity. It was this play on 
which Frulovisi’s efforts were modelled (Previté Orton 1915: 76), even in its being 
dedicated to Leonello (Lockwood 2009: 32). But Alberti would eventually realise the 
corrupting influence exerted by Guarino, in painting and beyond (concerning painting, 
see Baxandall 1965: 201), and in particular was hostile to the misogynous aspects of 
Frulovisi’s plays; at least the latter was bitterly complaining in 1435 that in Venice a 
certain ‘Leo Bestia’ (no doubt alluding to Leon Battista Alberti) had ‘excited the women 
against him’ (Previté Orton 1915: 76-7). Thus, if it has been argued that Guarino’s 
translation of Lucian’s Parasite was a model for Alberti’s Momus (Marsh 1994: 421), it is 
more than reasonable to add that the figure of Frulovisi could have given the inspiration 
for the main character of the work. 
 
Market society and the theatricalisation of social life: An Epilogue 
 
In order to pull the argument together, and connect it to the present, I offer a series of 
reflections prompted by a book by the Yale historian Jean-Christophe Agnew about the 
role of theatre in the genesis of modern capitalism. According to Agnew, this role was 
quite crucial: the theatre was the ‘laboratory’ (Agnew 1986: xi, 54) or the ‘incubator’ 
where the new type of social relationships, characteristics of the market society, and 
hostile to the very logic of ordinary human interaction and social life, were 
‘experimented’ with.  
 The starting point of the argument is the widespread recognition that ‘market 
relations’ are not natural, rather imply a certain kind of violence to the normal logic of 
social life: Agnew goes beyond the standard argument – without denying its partial 
relevance – that such relations are simply imposed by force. It is here that theatre comes 
to play a central role. The central element of market society, better identified in Simmel 
Philosophy of Money than in Marx’s Capital, is a certain kind of boundlessness, leading to ‘ 
“infinite purposiveness” ’ (p.4).7 Everything ‘on the market’ can be exchanged with 
everything else, which generates a vortex feeling of forever spiralling change; but this 
assumes that something, or someone, first of all enters this market, eliminating those 
boundaries and borderlines which previously tied human beings, spheres of lives and 
activities to concrete realms of existence. This can be done by physically destroying 
buildings and objects or by forcing humans to live at a certain place and in a certain way; 
but this can also be accomplished, in a much more peaceful and piecemeal but not less 
lethal way, by enacting life on a theatre, and thus stealing its substance, spirit and value.  
 According to Agnew, the way in which the theatre accomplished this feat was by 
combining imitation and fragmentation. Here we have a concrete example of the general 
point realised by Plato concerning the activities of the Sophist. There are two ways in 
which two equal and therefore replaceable and individually worthless pieces can be 
produced out of a single whole: by breaking it into two halves, or by copying it into a 
double. Theatre performed this trick by representing artificial persons on the stage who 
reduced concrete, living human beings into abstractions (the ‘merchant’, the ‘doctor’, the 
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‘knight’, the ‘servant’), often already on the stage doubling such generic figures (thus we 
often have two servants and two pairs of lovers; see for e.g. Shakespeare’s Comedy of 
Errors); and by doing so reducing the complex net of human relations and motivations to 
a very simple and identical moving force, desire or gain. In the next step, through the 
already mentioned ‘infinite purposiveness’, it managed to reduce human life to ‘an 
infinitely divisible series of trade-offs consciously or unconsciously entertained by the 
individual’ (Agnew 1986: 3). This was performed on the stage, where human life was 
represented as a combination of either antagonistic struggles, usually in the form of duels 
(usually with the purpose of erotic conquest), or as bargains, to which human 
conversation was reduced. 
 The central figure in the first period of the theatricalisation of social life (1550-
1650) was the actor, who possessed this ‘Protean’ character – a central metaphor of the 
times – of being able to literally metamorphose himself from one personality into 
another. This resulted in a schismogenic duel with the Puritans. The Puritans correctly 
identified the central problem of boundlessness, even recognised the crucial role played 
by the actor in dissolving boundaries and borderlines, jumping in between the liminal 
and the liminoid, and that therefore the world was ‘threatened to become, in effect, a 
permanent carnival’ (p.54), but erroneously thought that all this could be resolved by 
administrative and police action against the entertainers. They thus failed to realise, with 
Shakespeare, that if time is out of joint, or if the spirit is let loose, it is not so easy to tuck 
it back into the bottle. 
 Even further, the actors returned the challenge, accusing the Puritans with 
hypocrisy on their own.8 The fight between the actors and the Puritans was staged on the 
new public sphere, and it was not realised, just as it is not seen even today, that the 
public arena is indeed the par excellence place for wearing masks; and so the pretence of 
being totally straight and honest is the biggest and most ludicrous mask of all.  
 A particularly interesting and important aspect of this struggle was connected to 
sexual identity. One of the strongest challenges formulated against the actors concerned 
their promiscuity, helped by the altering of sexual identity due to male actors playing 
female roles. Actors, however, could rebuke that the Protestants, by denying any 
significance of sexuality and trying to wear identical, asexual clothes, approached in their 
indiscriminate and nondescript androgyny the most promiscuous hermaphroditism of 
the actors. 
 One of the most interesting points of Agnew is the idea that a kind of ‘pact’ 
emerged between the actors and the audience (pp. 114, 124); an implicit complicity best 
seen through the frequent use of asides, addressing the audience – a special feature of the 
English theatre. Such complicity and duplicity in breaking the codes and boundaries of 
social existence amounted to a joint breaking, or literally corruption. 
 
If in the first part of the theatricalisation of social life the public scene was dominated by 
the actor, in the second (1650-1750) focus shifted to the spectator. The central figure 
here is Adam Smith, who first identified the position of the ‘neutral spectator’ as a 
privileged point for moral philosophy, and from there could pronounce his well known 
judgments about laissez faire, the universality of the human motivation concerning gain, 
and the similar universality of the division of labour. 
 Two points will be made here, in order to close the argument. First, in the Theory 
of Moral Sentiments Adam Smith considered that human society is built on the foundation 
of sympathy, and this is often used to connect his argument to Mauss’s gift relations or 
Dilthey’s empathy. The point of Smith, however, was radically different. Sympathy for 
him did not mean some kind of natural feeling or predisposition that any human being 
had for any other in his own living space. Quite on the contrary, it meant a purely mental 
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state that could only be acquired from a distance, by somebody detached from the action, 
being a pure spectator. This, however, implies a prior rupture of intimate social relations 
that indeed can only emerge concretely, between embodied living human beings. Smith 
counterattacked by claiming that human beings who lived in the past without such 
distancing – a precondition of civilised life – were actually ignorant and poor, so could not 
have possessed any positive emotionality towards each other. It is here, in the idealisation 
of the position of the spectator, that we have the origin of the Enlightenment idea of 
progress, and the Darwin-Spencerian argument of linear evolution, carried further by 
Durkheim in his Division of Labour. 
 The second point is exactly concerned with the division of labour, the central 
analytical tool of Adam Smith’s economic theory; indeed the vantage point from which 
moral philosophy and political economy are all but equal. Here we again must take things 
at a face value: the division of labour literally implies the fragmentation of an activity; it 
therefore breaks a process, or a continuous participatory aspect of human life into 
segments. It does and perpetuates violence. Human life, just as Plato’s music, has its own 
rhythms; and the harmonious performance of various activities implies a respect for such 
rhythms, borderlines and identities. Rupturing takes place when a certain activity, say the 
making of a chair, is broken down into identical segments, where different people can 
become ‘specialised’ in the performance of this or that part of the process, and where 
eventually they can be replaced, through technological ‘progress’, by machines. Such 
fragmentation can continue into infinity; this is the meaning of digitalisation. This is 
rendered possible by the previous fragmentation, governed by the principle of gain and 
substitutability. The two halves complement each other, and form the taken for granted 
framework of rational choice theory, where the ‘autonomous’ and ‘rational’ individuals 
can increase their ‘earnings’ by infinitely fragmenting and breaking into pieces their own 
human and social lives. As human beings thus fragment and break their own life 
together, through ‘contracts’ that prepare and sanction such ‘mutual advantages’, the 
system works on the basis of ‘joint fragmentations’ or ‘joint breaking’, thus – literally – 
‘corruption’. The basic moving principle of market society is corruption; and the model 
through which corruption as guiding principle was invested and disseminated in social 
life was the theatre. 
 We indeed live in a ‘theatrocratic’ society; and just as the Athenians, we happen 
to call it democracy. According to Plato, and also Aristotle, the best form of government 
is ‘mixed government’, which harmoniously blends together the best elements of the two 
poles.9 In Europe, the best embodiment of mixed government for centuries was 
considered to be Venice; and it was exactly Venice where the theatricality experimented 
and ‘bred’ in Ferrara was transmitted to, and further developed, resulting around the 
middle of the 16th century in the Commedia dell’Arte which constitutes the background of 
Agnew’s analysis. 
 The reasons for this development, however, require a different paper. 
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Notes 	  
1 This is the famous spot where Plato uses the term parrhesia. 
2 This is what was discovered by Heidegger when writing his dissertation, leading him to 
the claim that the entire history of Western metaphysics is a commentary on five 
passages from Aristotle. 
3 Significantly, his Second Oration is devoted to objecting being called ‘ponderous’, the 
best proof how much he was (Anderson 1993: 43). 
4 This idea reached its extreme under Emperor Elagabalus (218-22), who ordered that all 
sexual acts performed on stage must be real and not simulated. 
5 In fact, after Chrysoloras’s death he edited a collection of essays entitled Chrysolorina for 
his memory. 
6 For some appreciation of his epochal importance see: ‘It was Frulovisi who launched 
the classical theatre in Venice’; Radcliff-Umstead (1969: 39); and ‘As a technician 
Frulovisi stands as a pioneer in the mechanics of the stage’ (Ibid.: 40). 
7 According to Agnew, a particularly good example for this is The Merchant of Venice. 
8 The term ‘hypocrite’ originally meant actor. 
9 For details on Plato’s related views, see the end of the Statesman. 
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